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implementation. We find that societal-level imaginaries that were built 
on deeply-held moral bases and cosmologies underpinned the conception 
of geoengineering, and that a dialectic process of discursive attempts to 
reconcile oppositional imaginaries increased the concreteness and 
credibility of geoengineering so that it increasingly has been treated as 
an ‘as-if’ reality. We suggest that distant futures orient collective efforts 
in distinctive ways, not as concrete guides for action but by expressing 
critiques and alternatives, that can become treated as ‘as-if’ realities.
 
Academy of Management Journal
Constructing a Distant Future: Imaginaries in Geoengineering 
Grace Augustine 
City University of London
grace.augustine@city.ac.uk
Sara Soderstrom
University of Michigan
capasb@umich.edu
Daniel Milner
Northwestern University
d-milner@kellogg.northwestern.edu
Klaus Weber
Northwestern University
klausweber@northwestern.edu
Acknowledgments: 
We thank the AMJ reviewers for their comments and especially Senior Editor Tima Bansal for her 
guidance through the review process. We are also grateful for invaluable feedback from participants of 
the 2017 AMJ paper development workshop at Ivey, the 2017 EGOS Sub-theme 43, the 2017 Academy 
of Management Symposium on Imagined Futures and Economic Mobilization; and participants of the 
SCANCOR Seminar at Stanford, the Searle Roundtable on Global Climate Change Governance at 
Northwestern and the Management & Organizations Brownbag at Kellogg. Natalie Byle and Ryan Ostir 
provided excellent research assistance. This research was financially supported by the Erb Institute at the 
University of Michigan. The first two authors contributed equally.
Page 1 of 65 Academy of Management Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
CONSTRUCTING A DISTANT FUTURE: IMAGINARIES IN GEOENGINEERING 
ABSTRACT
We develop the concept of the distant future as a new way of seeing the future in collective 
efforts. While a near future is represented in practical terms and concerned with forming 
expectations and goals under conditions of uncertainty, a distant future is represented in stylized 
terms and concerned with imagining possibilities under conditions of ambiguity. Management 
research on future-oriented action has developed around problems of the near future. To explore 
distant futures, we analyze the case of geoengineering, a set of planetary-scale technologies that 
have been proposed as solutions to the threat of climate change. Geoengineering has increasingly 
been treated as if it were a reality, despite continued controversy and in the absence of any 
implementation. We find that societal-level imaginaries that were built on deeply-held moral 
bases and cosmologies underpinned the conception of geoengineering, and that a dialectic 
process of discursive attempts to reconcile oppositional imaginaries increased the concreteness 
and credibility of geoengineering so that it increasingly has been treated as an ‘as-if’ reality. We 
suggest that distant futures orient collective efforts in distinctive ways, not as concrete guides for 
action but by expressing critiques and alternatives, that can become treated as ‘as-if’ realities.
Imagine a new world where a vast wall of mirrors is erected in outer space to protect the 
earth from the heat of the sun. Imagine using US Navy warships to blast trillions of tiny 
particles high up into the sky or deploying a fleet of modern ‘steam’ ships into the seven seas 
to spray salt water into the air 24 hours a day to create better clouds. Or how about covering 
vast stretches of desert with sheets of white plastic to reflect light back to the sun? What 
about dumping billions of tons of iron filings into the sea or building millions of chemically 
coated plastic trees to suck up carbon dioxide from the air? … This may all sound like 
preposterous science fiction - yet the debate about ‘geo-engineering’ a way out of 
catastrophic levels of climate change seems to be gaining grip in several parts of the world. 
(Pretoria News, 2009)
INTRODUCTION
Geoengineering refers to radical, deliberate, planetary-scale technological interventions 
into the earth’s atmospheric, oceanic, or terrestrial systems in order to counteract the effects of 
anthropogenic (human-caused) climate change (Nicholson, 2013). Compared to predominant 
responses that focus on reducing greenhouse gas emissions or adapting to the effects of climatic 
changes, geoengineering technologies may appear at once audacious and outrageous, as if they 
were taken from a Jules Verne novel: sun shields in space, injecting reflective particles into the 
stratosphere, or large scale ocean fertilization to stimulate CO2-absorbing plankton growth. The 
feasibility of these proposed technologies is untested, and their consequences, even if the 
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interventions were to work, are acknowledged to be nearly impossible to predict. Additionally, 
the governance options for geoengineering remain largely unresolved as actors grapple with 
questions about who should be given the power to decide when and how to “adjust the world’s 
thermostat.” While geoengineering may be in the realm of science fiction (none of the 
technologies have been deployed), it has been progressively been taken more seriously as an 
option for combating climate change by an array of authoritative actors, including scientists, 
policy makers, and environmental activists who have called for more research into these 
technologies and have issued reports on geoengineering’s potential and risks (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, 2011; National Research Council, 2015a, 2015b; Rayner, Heyward, 
Kruger, Pidgeon, Redgwell, & Savulescu, 2013; The Royal Society, 2009).  How was this risky, 
utopian solution to climate change imagined in the first place? And how has it made the leap 
from “preposterous science fiction” to becoming realistic enough to orient different actors, even 
as it remains hypothetical? 
Organizational research has increasingly recognized that considerations of the future are 
central to organizing processes (Gioia, Corley, & Fabbri, 2002; Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013; 
Garud, Schildt, & Lant, 2014; Flammer & Bansal, 2017). Yet this research has been concerned 
with processes that look quite different from geoengineering, such as strategic and technological 
change in organizations. It has suggested that acting on the future requires constructing a 
continuity between the present and future, for example in decision theory in the form of discount 
rates that integrate future expectations with present utilities (Laverty, 1996), or in strategy as 
temporal narratives that give accounts of how the future emerges from the past (Kaplan & 
Orlikowski, 2013). Implicit in this work is a uniform model of how people relate to the future –
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one that does not distinguish different types of futures and mostly assumes a continuity between 
present experience and the future.
The case of geoengineering presents a different type of future and suggests a need to 
develop a new way of looking at the role of the future in organizing. We introduce the concept of 
distant future - a representation of a future state of the world that is fictional in the sense that it 
presents a discontinuity with present reality and is not grounded in present experience (Schütz, 
1932/1967; Beckert, 2016) - to understand the case of geoengineering. By doing so we develop a 
differentiated understanding of the future in organizing processes. We posit that distant and near 
futures represent qualitatively different ways of envisioning the future and therefore entail 
different processes of construction and consequences for organizing. Distinguishing between the 
near future, which has been the primary focus of existing research, and the distant future, which 
is brought to the fore by the case of geoengineering, allows management researchers to expand 
their analytic toolkit and understand a broader range of phenomena. Geoengineering is an 
instance of one class of phenomena that are characterized by distant futures: collective responses 
to grand challenges. Grand challenges are “global problems that can be plausibly addressed 
through coordinated and collaborative effort.” (George, et al. 2016:1880). These problems entail 
extreme time horizons, fundamental uncertainty, and high complexity -- conditions under which 
existing near future frameworks arguably break down (Ferraro, Etzion, & Gehman, 2015). 
In the following, we present the results of our qualitative analysis of the phenomenon of 
geoengineering. Our research process was abductive, iterating between interpretation of data and 
theoretical development (Hanson, 1958; Peirce, 1955; Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). This 
process is reflected in the structure of the paper in that we present two iterations of empirical 
observation and theorization. We structure the paper in this way to show how engaging with a 
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new type of empirical phenomenon is an important part of the theoretical discovery process, 
prior to fine-grained data analysis. The first abductive iteration is an analysis of the case of 
geoengineering. In the next section, we first introduce the phenomenon of geoengineering as an 
observational prompt to assess existing theoretical frameworks. From this assessment, we then 
develop the theoretical distinction between distant and near futures, and a conceptual foundation 
for analyzing the distant future. This foundation draws on concepts about cognitive construal 
(Trope & Liberman, 2010; Berntsen & Bohm, 2010), collective imagination (Mische, 2009; 
Clarke, 2008, Beckert, 2016), and imaginaries (Anderson, 1991; Castoriadis, 1975; Taylor, 
2004). The second abductive iteration is a more detailed analysis within the case. Informed by 
the conceptual foundation that we developed for analyzing the distant future, we further 
investigate two research questions: 1) how the distant future of geoengineering was conceived, 
and 2) how came to be treated as if it were real. We report the methods and findings of our 
interpretative analysis of the evolution of geoengineering and from it, develop and refine our 
understanding of distant futures. We close by discussing how our work contributes a “new way 
of seeing” the future in organizing processes in contexts in which the distant future matters, such 
as entrepreneurship and disruptive change.
THE CASE OF GEOENGINEERING
The ideas and basic approaches that underlie geoengineering were originally put forth by 
scientists in the 1970s and 1980s as hypothetical solutions to controlling the weather and 
addressing what was then termed “global warming” (Fleming 2010). Geoengineering 
technologies fall into two categories: solar radiation management (SRM) and carbon dioxide 
removal (CDR). SRM strategies aim to cool the earth directly by reflecting or blocking sunlight 
in space, injecting reflective particles into the atmosphere, or putting reflective materials on 
terrestrial surfaces. CDR strategies aim to halt further warming by removing carbon dioxide 
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(CO2) from the atmosphere and securing it in long-term storage, through mechanical CO2 
“scrubbers,” massive sequestration of carbon in biomass (e.g., biochar), or stimulating oceanic 
plankton growth to capture CO2 and release oxygen. 
When first suggested, these were bold and radical thought experiments that were 
considered by most as not serious enough to even discuss as action strategies. Instead, climate 
scientists and policy makers focused primarily on strategies of mitigation, or reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions to eliminate the source of climate change, and adaptation, working to 
adjust to the impacts of changing climate. Even as the urgency of climate change has increased 
in recent decades and mitigation efforts have been slow to take hold, the question of whether or 
not geoengineering should even be considered a potential response has remained controversial. 
In addition to concerns of technical feasibility, many have argued that geoengineering 
“solutions” are morally or politically inconceivable or even dangerous. A 2007 article in The 
New York Times reflected these concerns quoting an expert in global environmental governance:
Pursuing wacky ideas sends the wrong message… these projects could breed a dangerous 
complacency: Governments and companies might fail to invest in already available means of 
cutting emissions only to find later that promised technologies failed, or wrought unintended 
havoc.
Other concerns include how adjusting the climate in one part of the world might affect 
other regions, which has led to questions about who should be given the power to decide when 
and how to “adjust the world’s thermostat.” Thus, governance and deployment questions have 
remained unresolved. 
While some have called for more research into proposed geoengineering solutions to 
prevent or counteract climate change’s harshest effects (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, 2011; National Research Council, 2015a, 2015b; Rayner, Heyward, Kruger, Pidgeon, 
Redgwell, & Savulescu, 2013; The Royal Society, 2009), all geoengineering technologies remain 
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purely hypothetical and none of them have been deployed or entered the stage of practical 
development. This is in stark contrast to mitigation strategies, such as cap and trade systems or 
renewable energy technologies, which are current realities, even if they are primarily aimed at 
solving or averting the climate crisis in the future. In the absence of practical experimentation 
and steps toward implementation, very little experiential evidence is available for evaluating or 
further developing geoengineering. It is not as if yesterday’s science fiction is becoming today’s 
or even tomorrow’s reality – we are not witnessing an inevitable or gradual technological 
adoption with geoengineering. 
However, despite remaining a hypothetical without any experience base, geoengineering 
has been taken more seriously over time. Table A in the Additional Materials shows a descriptive 
overview of the history of geoengineering. By the late 2000s some scientists, policy makers, and 
even some climate activists began discussing geoengineering as a superior option or a necessary 
back-up plan, and there is an increasing sense that geoengineering is no longer regarded as 
science fiction but is talked about as if it were a real option, on similar footing with more 
established solutions. A 2009 article in the Sunday Times wrote, for example, “Ideas that were 
once the realm of science fiction - such as creating artificial trees to absorb carbon dioxide, or 
reflecting sunlight away from the Earth - are coming under serious scrutiny as temperatures and 
CO2 emissions continue to rise.” This poses an empirical puzzle: how has geoengineering come 
to be taken seriously as a ‘real thing,’ even though it retains properties of science fiction or 
fantasy? Geoengineering presents a particularly vivid case for examining this question as well as 
broader question of the dynamics of distant futures (Eisenhardt, Graebner, & Sonenshein, 2016). 
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THEORIZING THE CASE: NEAR AND DISTANT FUTURES
The Future in Management Research
Management research increasingly acknowledges that considerations of the future are 
central to organizing processes (Gioia, Corley, & Fabbri, 2002; Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013; 
Garud, Schildt, & Lant, 2014; Slawinski & Bansal, 2012; 2015). Work has examined the 
consequences of the time horizons people employ when thinking about the future (Laverty, 1996; 
Flammer & Bansal, 2017) and how their constructions of perceived continuity between the past, 
present, and future facilitates or inhibits organizational change (Gioia et al., 2002; Kaplan & 
Orlikowski, 2013). Questions of how actors engage with “the future” are especially central to 
contexts that are overtly future oriented, such as design work and entrepreneurship. For example, 
Stigliani and Ravasi (2012) have found that designers within an organization were able to 
construct a shared view of the future by engaging in cycles of retrospective cognitive work that 
served to refine tentative interpretations. And Cornelissen and Clarke (2010) examined how 
entrepreneurs legitimate their ideas about “the future” and create opportunities through the 
deployment of analogies and metaphors. 
However, implicit in much of this research is the idea that in order to be consequential for 
action, perceptions of the future must be shared and reduce ambiguity about future states. For 
example, in their studies of corporate responses to climate change, Slawinski and Bansal find 
that companies that employ long-term views of the future are better equipped to deal with 
uncertainty (2012) and adopt more innovative responses to climate change (2015). Slawinski & 
Bansal (2015) and Kaplan & Orlikowski (2013) also highlight the importance of considering 
multiple scenarios with long-term outcomes. Developing multiple scenarios delays action but 
leads to more robust understandings of the future, a greater departure from the status quo, and 
more nuanced strategic responses (Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013; Slawinski & Bansal, 2015).
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At the same time, much of this work tends to focus on contexts in which a future 
orientation is formalized through organizational structures and goals (e.g., design work in 
Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012, climate change adaptation strategies in Slawinski & Bansal, 2012, 
2015). Or, it concerns relatively short-term and immediate projections (e.g., task forces in Gioia, 
Thomas, Clark, & Chittipeddi, 1994). The grounding in settings of formalized “future-oriented” 
action and in actors’ previous experiences makes existing research ill equipped to address how 
actors develop and engage with more radical and even utopian futures, like geoengineering. In 
geoengineering, we do not see consensus in future expectations, a reduction in ambiguity, or the 
conversion of expectations into goals and practical actions. And yet, geoengineering has come to 
be taken seriously. We suggest that by largely ignoring such radical futures, organizational 
researchers have overlooked a consequential distinction among futures.
Time Horizon vs. Distance: The Distinctive Quality of Distant Futures 
Although existing research has considered short- versus long-term time horizons, 
scholars have often extended standard ways of engaging with the future, such as time-discounted 
rational expectations models (Laverty, 1996; Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2002; 
Beckert, 2016) or temporal narratives of continuity between the past and the future (Garud, 
Schildt & Lant, 2014; Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013, Tavory & Eliasoph, 2013), to longer time 
horizons. Conceiving of the future in terms of time horizons sheds light on issues such as the 
implicit discount rates required to consider the long-term implication of present day actions 
(Flammer & Bansal, 2017), or the durations embedded in notions of the past, present, and future 
(Kim, Bansal, & Haugh, 2019). It masks, however, an additional dimension of the future that is 
based on the phenomenological quality of the future rather than the time horizon. We refer to this 
dimension as a future’s distance, distinguishing distant from near futures. 
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The difference between near and distant futures is not a matter of time horizon. Instead, 
distance suggests that there are qualitatively different ways of representing and experiencing the 
future. Distant futures raise a set of different concerns from most existing organizational 
scholarship, concerns that are central to understanding cases such as geoengineering. Prior 
research has predominantly focused on near future concerns such as uncertainty, risk of choices, 
and the challenge of forming expectations with partial knowledge. Distant futures, however, are 
characterized by ambiguity or ‘radical uncertainty’ and focus on the question of how alternatives 
are imagined in the first place, and the corresponding problem of how such largely hypothetical 
possibilities may orient collective action. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of distant 
compared to near futures. 
*** Please insert Table 1 about here *** 
Temporal construal level theory (Liberman & Trope 1998, Trope & Liberman 2003, 
Berntsen & Bohn, 2010) suggests that the distinction between near and distant futures is one of 
the level of construal, which reflects how psychologically distant a future state is from lived 
experience. In this perspective, futures that are represented as more psychologically near are 
construed in more concrete terms using more detailed situational features, while distant futures 
are construed in more abstract terms, using more stylized essential features of a situation 
(Liberman & Trope 1998, Trope & Liberman 2003, Berntsen & Bohn, 2010). The concrete 
concepts that are used to construct near futures are connected to sensory observation and the 
degree of practicality of proposed actions, which relate the future to present or personal 
experience, while the abstract concepts used in envisioning distant futures are tied to broader 
theories, ideologies, and desired identities (Medin, 1989; Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010; 
Berntsen & Bohn, 2010). As a result, people relate to near and distant futures in qualitatively 
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different ways. Empirical research has shown that near futures are evaluated on their feasibility 
(which is tied to the concrete features of experience) while distant futures are evaluated more on 
their desirability (which is tied to the abstract features and the belief systems that are used in 
constructing them) (Liberman & Trope 1998). An important implication is that the value people 
attach to near futures is discounted when they appear more remote, as is assumed in rational 
decision making models, but the value of distant futures is actually augmented with greater 
distance because their desirability is less tapered by concerns of feasibility (Liberman & Trope 
1998). The dimensions of psychological distance and time horizon are analytically distinct even 
though they are often correlated in practice. For example, demographers can make very long-
range projections of population growth, a society’s age distribution and urbanization, yet such 
futures are not distant from present experience but directly generated from it. Conversely, 
geoengineering represents a distant future, even for people that hope to implement the 
technology within a decade, because it represents a break from present understandings.  
These differences of construal also manifest themselves in collective phenomenologies 
and social practices of envisioning futures. For example, Beckert (2013, 2016) as well as Clarke 
(2008) suggest that distant futures often arise from social processes that involve expressing 
fantasy and fictional hypotheticals rather than from negotiating consensual expectations and 
calculated extensions of the present, such as forecasts. Work on the collective nature of futures 
highlights two aspects of distant futures that arise from the social context in which cognitive 
processes are embedded. The first is that distant futures are distant not only in terms of 
abstraction, but that this abstraction also allows them to be more discontinuous with present day 
conventions and institutionalized beliefs. Distant futures are focused on possibilities rather than 
probabilities (Clarke, 2008), and thus often offer alternatives that critique present day social 
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reality (Mische, 2009: 695; 2014). The articulations of distant futures are thus commonly 
triggered during crisis or alienation, when people turn to ideologies, identities, and theories for 
guidance (Swidler, 1986). The second insight from the study of the social dynamics of distant 
futures is that they are often constructed in contexts that are overtly future oriented. Mische 
(2009, 2014), for example, examined the qualities of such ‘sites of hyperprojectivity’ in the 
context of UN summits on sustainable development, where there is deliberate focus among 
participants on envisioning alternative futures.   
As-if Reality: When Distant Futures Orient Action
Given the distinctive qualities of distant futures as ambiguous, abstract, hypothetical, 
removed from experience, and representing a break from collective beliefs and conventional 
practice, it is not clear when and how distant futures would orient people’s actions. In fact, 
distant futures can simply remain fantasies that are known to be unrealistic, playful thought 
experiments without a claim to actionability, or utopias that are deliberately constructed to be 
unreal and unattainable. Thus to orient human effort, distant futures must at the same time be 
seen as fictional and yet be taken seriously enough to inspire action towards realizing them. 
Drawing on Beckert (2013, 2016), we conceptualize this quality as distant futures taking on an 
‘as-if’ reality, which he defines as the “inhabitation in the mind of an imagined future state of the 
world” (Beckert 2013: 219). When a distant future takes on ‘as-if’ reality, people begin to see 
themselves in the future state, which orients their actions towards (or away from) this future. 
‘As-if’ reality is what distinguishes distant futures with social consequences from pure fantasy or 
playful imagination. Table 2 contrasts the characteristics of ‘as-if’ reality versus fantasy.
*** Please insert Table 2 about here *** 
Distant futures are not automatically taken seriously, and gaining ‘as-if’ reality is in fact a 
challenge precisely because of the way that distant futures are construed in the first place. 
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Psychological research suggests that distant futures in general do not guide behavior very well. 
For example, McCrea, Liberman, Trope & Sherman (2008) show more distant futures to 
generate less urgency towards action (and instead engender more procrastination), and Oettingen 
(2012) shows that fantasies (desired futures without likelihood judgments) impede effort and 
have less of an effect on behavior. Similarly, Bloch (1923/2000) has suggested that utopias, 
which are quintessential distant futures, give shape to desires but are rarely realized, and even 
when they are they normally only give rise to small social enclaves (Levitas, 2013). 
However, this work also suggests that the concreteness of a future may change as 
fantasies can be cognitively transformed to resemble less distant futures that have a closer 
association with experiential reality (Oettingen, 2012:31, Kappes & Oettingen, 2014). This 
insight mirrors predictions from construal level theory that when abstract futures become 
represented through increasingly concrete and detailed concepts, they will be seen as more near 
and hence more actionable. ‘As-if’ reality is thus generated by making distant futures more 
concrete (in terms of construal). And it is also generated by making the future more credible, in 
terms of taking it seriously enough to consider its possible consequences and its role in goal 
pursuits or expressions of identity. People glean the credibility of a future from how easily they 
can make sense of it in relation to personal experience, and from social cues, such as the 
behaviors of others. Both concreteness and credibility make a future more plausible (Weick, 
1995) and serious (Beckert, 2016) than mere fantasy. 
Imaginaries in Constructing Distant Futures
There is a body of research on “imaginaries” that illuminates where distant futures 
originate, and how and when they may become treated as a reality that orients action. The 
concept of imaginaries has been developed by social theorists and philosophers to describe broad 
shared conceptions of the world and humanity’s place in it (Castoriadis, 1975/1987; Bloch, 
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1923/2000; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Imaginaries are deep cultural structures (Sewell, 1992) that 
form the pervasive and often unarticulated backdrop to more tangible knowledge, norms, and 
institutions; they provide a moral orientation and epistemological underpinning of reality (e.g., 
Castoriadis, 1975/1987). The imaginary refers to the phenomenological reality of images, or 
mind-made coherent objects that do not require language for their representation; they arise as 
much from desires as from sensory observation and experience. Imaginaries are thus fictional 
(not mere representations of reality), tacit (not fully articulated and discursively accessible), and 
psychologically distant (stylized, not concrete). It is because of these image-like qualities that 
imaginaries can orient the collective construal and affect the degree of ‘as-if’ reality of distant 
futures. Imaginaries encompass basic cosmologies of the world as well as a moral basis for 
evaluating action. Cosmologies are the belief systems regarding the foundational premises for 
making sense of the world, such as the origin, components, and mechanics of the social and 
material world (Douglas, 1970). Castoriadis (1975/1987), for example, contrasts fundamentally 
different views of the origin of the world, out of chaos in Greek mythology versus as a divine 
creation in Judaism, and their corresponding cosmologies. The moral order is the idealized 
character and underlying attitude that people seek in themselves and others (Geertz, 1957; 
Voronov & Weber, 2016). Charles Taylor (2004) has written extensively about the imaginary of 
Western Modernity, for example, and emphasized that Modernity is premised on a morality that 
evaluates societal norms and values in light of their benefit to individuals.
While imaginaries are not exclusively future-focused, they do map on to distant futures, 
either as an ideal or feared state. On the one hand, at their core is a cosmology that includes 
assumptions about the course of history (such as a march towards progress), which acts as a 
symbolic resource for the creation and interpretation of images of the future (e.g. Levitas, 2013). 
Page 14 of 65Academy of Management Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
On the other hand, the moral dimension of imaginaries means that they include ideals about the 
self, social group, and humanity that are aspirational rather than realized (Gaonkar, 2002; 
Appadurai, 2004). These desires guide the process of imagination (what is likely to be imagined 
in the first place) and vests people emotionally in realizing or preventing a distant future. 
The limited work on imaginaries within management research has evoked imaginaries as 
a source of contestation (Levy & Spicer, 2013), to characterize broad societal models (e.g., the 
“capitalist imaginary” in Wright, Nyberg, De Cock, & Whiteman, 2013) or as an interpretive 
frame (e.g., views of permaculture in Roux-Rosier et al., 2018), but not in the context of 
constructing futures. Existing work also shows that imaginaries can stimulate and coordinate 
action at a collective scale, including underpinning revolutionary projects (Castoriadis, 
1975/1987), the creation of nation states (Anderson, 1991), or the expansion of modern 
rationality into everyday life (Taylor, 2004). Beckert and Bronk (2018) highlight the importance 
of imaginaries particularly for envisioning and realizing futures under conditions of high 
uncertainty and disagreement. The moral bases and cosmologies of imaginaries make the future 
relevant, even when an imaginary suggests a radical alternative to the present. The connection is 
established not by a narrative of continuity, but by a normative critique of the present state. 
METHOD FOR ANALYZING THE DISTANT FUTURE
Within-Case Data
To analyze dynamics of the distant future in geoengineering, we assembled a longitudinal 
database of documents. We gathered an extensive number of key documents on geoengineering 
across multiple types of actors and discursive spaces, including texts produced by climate 
scientists, social scientists, activists, journalists, and policy makers. Our database includes the 
following types of sources: 1) highly-cited scientific articles; 2) popular press books; 3) 
governmental reports and hearings; 4) recorded speeches and debates; 5) press releases, online 
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articles, and websites from non-governmental organizations; 6) reports from conferences; and 7) 
newspaper articles. For the newspaper articles, we developed a set of geoengineering-related 
keywords and gathered all news articles that included them through 2016 in the LexisNexis 
Academic database.1 Table B in the Additional Materials summarizes the data, which include 
over 2,500 documents totaling over 12,000 pages of text and 23 hours of video. 
Analyses 
To answer our empirical research questions, how a distant future is conceived and how it 
acquires greater as-if reality, we performed a multi-step, abductive analysis of the evolution of 
geoengineering, in which we iterated between interpreting data and developing theory, such that 
our analyses were informed by theoretical frameworks, and the choice of theoretical frameworks 
was guided by our data (Peirce, 1955; Snow, Morrill & Anderson, 2003; Timmermans & Tavory, 
2012). Abductive research is designed to discover new patterns of explanation, acknowledging 
explicitly that the appreciation of observational data is shaped by the researchers’ frameworks 
and exposure to existing theories (Hanson, 1958). Our analysis in this within-case abductive 
iteration was guided by the theoretical building blocks of the distant future discussed above. We 
then proceeded to formulating the empirical questions, examining data to inform or modify 
theoretical understandings, and then integrating what we uncovered in the case to build a 
theoretical model of how people collectively engage with and organize around a distant future.
Identification of imaginaries and dimensions. To better understand our setting and case, 
we first asked: what imaginaries exist in the context of geoengineering? In our research team, we 
began with each co-author independently reading a sample of the non-news documents and 
1 The article search keywords include: 1) albedo modification; 2) carbon dioxide removal; 3) cirrus cloud 
modification; 4) climate engineering; 5) direct air capture and sequestration 6) geoengineering; 7) geo-engineering; 
8) marine cloud brightening; 9) ocean iron fertilization; 10) solar radiation management; and 11) surface albedo. 
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noting how geoengineering was portrayed. We then met as a group and discussed evidence of 
imaginaries in the data. We utilized the two dimensions of imaginaries that we derived from 
existing literature, namely a moral basis and cosmology, to distinguish potential imaginaries in 
the texts. In reading the texts for imaginaries, we proceeded through two refinements: first, we 
found additional dimensions of imaginaries in the data on geoengineering: a present-to-future 
link and a stance (which we identified inductively from our analysis), and second, we also 
recognized a set of sub-components within each dimension, which we were then able to identify 
and code. Equipped with this refined set of dimensions and components, we iteratively identified 
five imaginaries within the non-news data: 1) Technofix; 2) Human Hubris; 3) Plan B; 4) 
Governance First; and 5) Conspiracy of Elite Control. To validate the imaginaries, two co-
authors and one research assistant coded a subset of the news media articles across our period of 
study. This analysis provided support for the five imaginaries as being robust across different 
data sources as they were identified first in one set of texts (the non-news archival data) and then 
examined in a distinct set of texts (the news articles). Data exemplars for the imaginaries are 
included in Table C of the Additional Materials. 
Descriptive temporal mapping of imaginaries. In our analyses, we noticed that the 
prominence of different imaginaries changed over time. To perform a more formal analysis of 
these changes, we looked for contextual markers of different phases to temporally organize the 
data and link trends in the discourse to broader changes. We identified several events, such as the 
publication of a watershed article on geo-engineering by a prominent climate scientist, Paul 
Crutzen, in 2006 and a report on geoengineering by the U.K.’s premiere scientific body, the 
Royal Society, in 2009. We also tracked the first appearance of new imaginaries, changes in 
actors’ involvement, and variation of imaginaries in the media sources. From this, we identified 
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five phases in the discourse about geoengineering: phase 1: pre-1990; phase 2: 1990-2005; phase 
3: 2006; phase 4: 2007-2009; and phase 5: 2010-2016.
 Then, we measured the temporal prominence of the imaginaries within these phases, 
noting their relationship to one another and the actor that each mention of an imaginary was 
attributed to in the text. We did this by first constructing a corpus from a purposeful temporal 
sample of news articles that included one news article on the 1st and 15th day of each month, or 
next closest day, following the sampling strategy outlined in Grodal (2018).2 The general news 
media only began notable coverage of geoengineering after 1990 (phase 1), but this was 
preceded by discourse in scientific circles. Therefore, we drew on scientific articles for the pre-
1990 phase. Because these early scientific articles may not have used the term geoengineering, 
we retrieved all articles referenced by the two most highly cited scientific articles on Google 
Scholar related to geoengineering (Keith, 2000; Marchetti, 1977) and the highly cited article by 
Crutzen (2006). We coded this full corpus of scientific and news articles for instances that 
reflected any dimension of the five imaginaries. This resulted in 647 instances of imaginaries.
We then examined the co-occurrence of imaginaries within each source, measuring this 
as the number of times that two imaginaries were mentioned in the same article, divided by the 
total number of co-occurrences across all pairs of imaginaries. Then, to attribute each instance of 
an imaginary to an actor, we coded each text excerpt with the name of the individual or 
organization that invoked it. For example, if an imaginary was referenced in a quote from a 
climate scientist, it would be attributed to the scientist, whereas if it was discussed in the body of 
2 The limited news coverage on geoengineering before 2006 constrained the sample sizes for Phase 1 (3 articles) and 
Phase 2 (65 articles with an average of 4 articles/year). The sample from Phase 3 was 33, Phase 4 was 131, and 
Phase 5 was 164 articles. The resulting corpus reflected diverse regions, including Europe (31%); North America 
(31%); Australia (19%); and others (19%); as well as national (e.g., The New York Times) and local (e.g., St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch) news outlets.
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a news article without any attribution, it was attributed to the journalist. Our actor analysis 
resulted in six actor types: 1) climate scientists; 2) activists and non-governmental organizations; 
3) social scientists; 4) conspiracy theorists; 5) journalists; and 6) businesses. We cross-tabulated 
the coded imaginaries and their co-occurrences by actor and by phase. 
Interpretation: Increasing ‘as-if’ reality and dialectic process. In addition to our 
descriptive analysis of the changing frequencies and patterns of co-occurrences in the discourse, 
we also began to note that geoengineering was increasingly being talked about more as if it were 
real in the discourse. This is despite the fact that our deep contextual understanding of the case 
verified that no significant implementation had taken place. The descriptive analysis also 
indicated that the changing co-occurrence pattern of imaginaries reflected more substantive 
relationships between the imaginaries. To move further from data to theory development, we 
again adhered to an abductive approach, abstracting up from fine grained coding to a recognition 
of larger patterns and explanatory processes. In doing so, we first revisited the literature on how 
futures take on ‘as-if’ reality (Mische 2014; Beckert 2013) and in parallel refined our analyses of 
our data. We then recognized two components of ‘as-if’ reality that connected our empirical 
patterns to the notion of ‘as-if’ reality in prior theory: concreteness and credibility. Concreteness 
is captured by the discourse around geoengineering moving from an abstract idea or ideal to one 
with more specificity, detail, and nuance reflecting a more concrete ontological reality. 
Credibility, we find, is shown through the diversity of actors that deem it worthy of engagement 
and further elaboration (this is distinct from the idea that geoengineering is positively valued). 
In addition to an overall increase in ‘as-if’ reality over time, we also saw a pattern of 
continued contestation with an increasingly differentiated system of perspectives on 
geoengineering. We saw that some imaginaries were strongly linked to pervasive cosmologies 
Page 19 of 65 Academy of Management Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
and moral orders that extended beyond the geoengineering context, while others were developed 
within the domain. The relationships between imaginaries over time in our descriptive analyses 
prompted us to look for interpretive frameworks that could explain this pattern. We found 
dialectic analysis particularly apropos for integrating the observed temporal changes, capturing 
the diverse relationships between imaginaries and reflecting the ongoing contestation in the 
discourse on geoengineering. Dialectical analysis offers a structural framework for 
understanding manifest patterns of change that involve controversy and conflict (e.g., 
Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Seo & Creed, 2002; van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Dialectical 
analysis examines change processes as sequences of the progression of theses, logical antitheses, 
and possible syntheses. In the last step in our analyses, we carried out a dialectic mapping of the 
imaginaries and found it to be a good fit for how imaginaries were in evoked by actors in 
debates, and how they co-occurred in the news articles. Finally, we consolidated and connected 
the concepts we identified through our abductive analyses into a general model of the  dynamics 
of how a distant future is imagined and moves towards an increasing ‘as-if’ reality.
FINDINGS: THE DYNAMICS OF DISTANT FUTURES
Dimensions and Dialectics of Imaginaries in Geoengineering
Through our analyses of the discourse surrounding geoengineering we identified five 
imaginaries: 1) Technofix; 2) Human Hubris; 3) Plan B; 4) Governance First; and 5) Conspiracy 
of Elite Control, which are summarized in Table 3. As we identified these imaginaries, we found 
that they were each comprised of a set of high-level “dimensions” and underlying “components” 
within those dimensions.3 The first dimension, an imaginary’s Moral Basis, connects to deeply-
held cultural values through three components: 1) an Ethos, 2) Corresponding Values, and 3) 
3 Throughout the findings, we capitalize and italicize the names of imaginaries, e.g., Technofix, and capitalize but do 
not italicize constituent dimensions and components, e.g., Moral Basis, Ethos.
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Evaluation Criteria. The second dimension is an imaginary’s Cosmology, which is the 
knowledge that is considered central to its worldview; it includes two components: 1) Privileged 
Epistemic Domains, and 2) Authoritative Actors. The next two dimensions emerged inductively 
through our analyses of the discourse surrounding geoengineering and represent more specific 
applications of cosmologies and moral bases to geoengineering. The first is the Present-to-Future 
Link, which includes the components of 1) A Situational Diagnosis and Metaphor of the Present 
Situation; 2) A Positive Vision of the Future; and 3) A Narrative of How to Get There. And the 
final dimension is the Stance, which includes 1) The Argument about the Role of 
Geoengineering; 2) The Position (for, against, etc.) Toward Geoengineering; and 3) the Proposed 
Solution. Examples of each dimension are in Table D in the Supplemental Material. 
*** Please insert Table 3 about here ***
We found that the constellation of discourse and actors surrounding the distant future of 
geoengineering followed a dialectic process that led to an increased differentiation of imaginaries 
and corresponding understandings of geoengineering. This process was driven by imaginaries 
that represent theses, antitheses that oppose those theses, and syntheses that attempt to resolve 
these underlying oppositions. The first imaginary that was articulated in the discourse, the thesis 
that gave rise to the initial idea of geoengineering, was that of Technofix. Technofix views the 
earth as something that can be engineered and geoengineering as just another logical step in the 
progress of man’s domination over nature. It encompasses a metaphor of geoengineering as a 
thermostat for easily adjusting the earth’s temperature. We also find that Technofix was imported 
from broader society to the specific context of geoengineering, which we discuss in more detail 
in the following section. After it was imported, it attracted opposition, based on different ideals 
and belief systems, in the form of the Human Hubris imaginary, an imaginary found in many 
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other discourses and not confined to the geoengineering context. Human Hubris is grounded in 
the idea that man has a history of failed attempts to dominate nature and sees geoengineering as 
not addressing the root cause of climate change, which is lifestyles that do not respect planetary 
boundaries. Human Hubris contains an argument that even discussing geoengineering poses the 
moral hazard of distracting from the real work of climate change mitigation efforts.
The fundamental incompatibility between these first two imaginaries arises from their 
cosmological and moral bases, and represents the beginning of a dialectic process, with 
Technofix as the thesis and Human Hubris its antithesis. Technofix advocates for a conquering of 
this latest frontier of man’s domination over nature, assessing climate change as a technical 
problem and offering geoengineering as a solution that requires little change to existing 
lifestyles. Human Hubris critiques man’s historical attempts to dominate nature, highlighting 
ways in which this has backfired, and assesses climate change primarily as a social problem 
grounded in moral failures such as greed and egotism. 
Over time there were attempts to resolve this deep opposition through a synthesis of the 
imaginaries. The first attempted synthesis occurred during Phase 3 when a different imaginary, 
Plan B, gained prominence. Plan B set forth the idea that geoengineering should be treated as a 
backup option in case all other attempts at addressing climate change fail. While Plan B 
addressed some of the underlying opposition between the existing imaginaries, it did not 
completely resolve them. We therefore see an additional attempted synthesis through the 
introduction of Governance First, which emphasizes the failure of climate negotiations and 
argues that comprehensive, accountable governance systems need to be in place before 
geoengineering can even be researched, or else geoengineering will be unilaterally deployed by a 
single individual or nation. Finally, during the last phase of our study, we see the importation of 
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one additional societal imaginary, the Conspiracy of Elite Control, as an antithesis to 
Governance First. This imaginary is based on the claim that geoengineering is already being 
deployed covertly and argues that we need to move towards a future in which its use is 
discontinued by taking power back from elites. The full dialectic process is shown in Figure 1. 
We discuss this process in the following sections, and connect it to our research questions of how 
distant futures are envisioned in the first place and how they take on ‘as-if’ reality.
*** Please insert Figure 1 about here ***
Imagining a Distant Future: The Importation of the Technofix Imaginary (pre-1990)
Our analyses suggest that the distant future of geoengineering initially arose from the 
importation of a societal-level technocentric imaginary of scientific progress and human mastery 
of nature into the domain of climate change, which offered a break from the long-standing 
approaches of mitigation and adaptation. The original propositions for even considering 
geoengineering were motivated and justified by a broader societal imaginary regarding 
humanity’s rational and technological capacities and relationship with nature that can be traced 
back at least to the advent of Western Modernity (documented, e.g., by Gaonkar, 2002; Jasanoff 
& Kim, 2015; and Taylor, 2004). We term this imaginary Technofix. This societal-level 
imaginary was applied to the domain of climate change to envision geoengineering. Through 
Technofix, nature is viewed as a machine-like system that can be manipulated and improved for 
human progress. Nature can accordingly be managed through the use of technical knowledge, 
enabling a progression towards greater control (Jasanoff & Kim, 2015). 
 During this phase, discussions of geoengineering occurred primarily in scientific articles. 
Until 1990, geoengineering received almost no coverage in the news media, which indicates that 
it was not reaching a broader public. In this early discourse, geoengineering was almost 
exclusively envisioned through the Technofix imaginary. The content of two dimensions of 
Page 23 of 65 Academy of Management Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Technofix, its Moral Basis and Cosmology, are largely imported from the societal-level 
technocentric imaginary. And the other two dimensions, the Present-To-Future Link and Stance, 
are foremost logical extensions of the Moral Basis and Cosmology to the domain of climate 
change. This importation and extension underpinned the initial imagining of a distant future of 
geoengineering and the initial steps of concretizing a broader societal-level imaginary within a 
more specific domain. The Ethos of Technofix is that humanity rules over nature thanks to 
scientific genius, rationality, and ingenuity. Early discourse on geoengineering reflected this 
Ethos, talking about geoengineering as a matter-of-fact solution to was then called the 
“greenhouse problem,” for example claiming that “the basis for a technologically and 
economically feasible operation does exist” (Marchetti, 1977). A 1989 article in Nature 
discussed the option of a sunshade in this manner: 
This difficulty may be overcome, and the 3.5% reduction achieved, with a minimum mirror 
area of 4.5 x 10^6 km, by positioning a satellite in such a way that it will always stand 
between the sun and the earth, permanently casting its shadow on the Earth. 
Within the Technofix Cosmology, knowledge of science, technology, and engineering is 
most privileged, and during this phase actors from these disciplines are the primary ones 
discussing geoengineering and referenced in discussion of it. Articles focused on the technical 
feasibility of geoengineering, but not its ethics, desirability, or political feasibility. When actors 
invoked the Present-to-Future Link of Technofix they often employed a Metaphor of turning 
down the temperature on the Earth’s thermostat. Additionally, a Positive Vision of the Future 
was constructed that illustrated that with this simple tweak the earth and humanity will have been 
saved from catastrophe. For example, the single news article in this phase that discussed 
geoengineering stated, “mankind may be able to counteract these potentially catastrophic 
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changes in the global climate in a rather simple, if ingenious, way” (The Guardian, 1987). The 
Technofix Stance was largely in support of geoengineering.
In this phase, we find that the distant future of geoengineering is initially generated from 
the importation of a societal-level imaginary that is reduced to its central tenets, in the form of its 
Moral Basis and Cosmology. Given the content of Technofix, it is not surprising that 
geoengineering was at first imagined by scientists and engineers. The linkage between the distant 
future of geoengineering and the powerful societal imaginary of technological progress and 
human ingenuity afforded the idea of geoengineering some initial credibility with those most 
ideologically committed to this societal-level imaginary (e.g., scientists). Yet, the distant future 
of geoengineering is at first vague and incomplete, focused on relatively simple hypothetical 
calculations and not concerned with practical actions toward implementation. 
Increasing ‘As-if’ Reality via Opposition: Importation of Human Hubris (1990 - 2005) 
Opposition to the Technofix view of geoengineering began to appear in the early 1990s. 
This opposition did not simply take the form of a more negative stance toward geoengineering. 
Rather, it was more fundamental, grounded on the importation and articulation of a societal-level 
ecocentric imaginary that has long stood in logical opposition to Technofix. The ecocentric view 
is deeply skeptical of human rationality and technological solutions (Brulle, 1996; Oelschlaeger, 
1991). It is based on the idea that nature is a complex system that humans depend on but can 
never fully know, manipulate, or control (Eckersley, 1992; Oelschlaeger, 1991). It offers a 
critique of rational-scientific and anthropocentric views as having a “mechanistic, atomistic, and 
empiricist framework for understanding nature,” as well as being guided by “technocentric 
ideologies that promote efficient, scientific ways of doing things, neglecting both care for nature 
and human well-being” (Garforth, 2018: 56; 61). In the ecocentric imaginary, there is an intrinsic 
moral value in nature, beyond its use for humans. Humans must respect nature, or face 
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catastrophic consequences. The deep-seated and pervasive opposition of Human Hubris to 
Technofix prompted this critique to be raised almost reflexively about geoengineering. 
Controversy over geoengineering was not a practical debate about feasibility and functionality 
(as would be expected for a near future), but instead largely a reflection of deeper philosophical 
oppositions between imaginaries.
Human Hubris was thus imported and applied to the domain of climate change as an 
antithesis to Technofix. The Ethos of Human Hubris is that humans are dilettantes when it comes 
to nature, a humble “guest” of nature, without the capacity to fully understand or control it. 
Hence, human attempts to intervene in nature generally backfire. The Human Hubris Cosmology 
privileges the epistemic domains of ethics, social science, and ecology. For example, one article 
that articulated the Human Hubris imaginary raised the question of the “ethics of geo-
engineering, or even of conducting research toward that goal,” and then quoted an oceanographer 
who said, “It’s so naive to think that we can do one thing and it’s going to have a predictable 
effect. The arrogance of human beings is just astounding” (Science News, 1995). The other two 
dimensions - the Present-to-Future Link and the Stance - were articulated as Human Hubris was 
specified to geoengineering. The Diagnosis for the Present Situation is that the cause of climate 
change is humanity’s modern lifestyles that do not respect planetary boundaries. Hence, 
geoengineering is viewed as a proposal that does not address the root cause of the problem. 
Rather, it is a foolish and potentially dangerous distraction. We find these themes throughout the 
discourse. For example, as early as 1994, one article stated:
If people think there may be simple technical solutions for problems like global warming, 
they’ll be much less likely to tackle the underlying causes -- by drastically cutting back their 
use of fossil fuels, for instance. In addition, any attempt to control climate could have serious 
unforeseen side effects, some of which may be irreversible. (Mercury News) 
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In this early discourse surrounding geoengineering, Technofix and Human Hubris 
appeared frequently in the same source, indicating that they were being debated as a central 
opposition, rather than being produced through separate discourses or employed by actors who 
were talking past one another. For example, within the same article from The Observer in 2003, 
at first Human Hubris was invoked, through a quote from an expert who stated that 
geoengineering “would be folly on a global scale.” In that same article, Technofix was brought 
in, in the voice of prospective entrepreneurs who were arguing for action to be taken to realize 
geoengineering and envisioned “tracts of sea being seeded with soluble iron compounds.” At the 
end of the article, it returns to concerns based on Human Hubris, stating that geoengineering 
“could be well under way before it was realized that an ecological disaster had been triggered.” 
Before 1990, Technofix was the only imaginary discussed by climate scientists. In this 
second phase, however, some scientists began to invoke Human Hubris in debating the distant 
future of geoengineering. For example, in 1991 an atmospheric scientist raised the Human 
Hubris argument, stating that some people may be “concerned about the potential irreversibility 
of any intervention… others simply do not trust technology can extract society from a problem 
that technology created” (MacCracken, 1991). This debate amongst scientists was reflected in 
the news media as well. For example, another atmospheric scientist invoked the Human Hubris 
Diagnosis of the Present Situation, saying, “the danger in proposing quick-fix schemes is that 
people will continue to ignore the source of the problem” (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 1994). Yet, 
the critique of Human Hubris did not supplant Technofix but prompted proponents to further 
elaborate and provide vivid images of the geoengineering options. This made the distant future 
more concrete, as a 2001 article illustrates:
Scientists have proposed fleets of Mylar balloons and giant orbiting mirrors. Other ideas 
make use of an air pollutant called sulfate that reflects sunlight. One scientist has suggested 
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giant guns that shoot sulfate particles into the atmosphere; another would send up a fleet of 
extra-dirty jets to spew sulfate into the sky, forming a planetary sunscreen (USA Today).
The contestation of geoengineering within the still central group of scientists on the one 
hand signaled that scientists considered the distant future of geoengineering as credible enough 
to be worthy of their debate. It also shows that the opposition between imaginaries cannot simply 
be attributed to oppositions between different interest groups, but that it instead has its roots in a 
more pervasive opposition at the level of a deep cultural structure.
 In this phase, the discourse also expanded from scientific articles to the news media, 
often in the context of the controversy between Technofix and Human Hubris. In their coverage, 
journalists still primarily quoted climate scientists, but invoked Technofix and Human Hubris as 
opposite poles for assessing geoengineering. Geoengineering also began to be considered in 
policy documents within the scientific community, reflecting an engagement in discursive action 
toward a distant future of geoengineering by additional groups beyond climate scientists. For 
example, a 1991 National Academy of Sciences report discussed geoengineering options 
alongside other means of addressing global warming and noted (mostly through a Technofix 
lens) that “Geoengineering options appear technically feasible in terms of cooling effects and 
costs on the basis of currently available preliminary information” (The National Academy of 
Sciences, 1991). News and policy coverage broadened the audience and invited engagement 
from actors beyond the climate scientists that were original proponents of geoengineering. It also 
signaled that a broader audience of authoritative actors were taking the distant future of 
geoengineering seriously enough to engage with it, which, even when they critiqued it, signaled 
to others that it was credible. This contestation within this central actor group indicates that the 
actors were treating the distant future of geoengineering as real enough to be worthy of their 
attention and debate beyond a single imaginary, again lending it credibility.
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In sum, during this phase, the fundamental opposition between Technofix and Human 
Hubris imaginaries as dialectic thesis and antithesis played out as Human Hubris provided a 
vivid alternative for the distant future of geoengineering. This debate occurred both within and 
outside of the scientific community, leading to more concrete geoengineering proposals. 
Additionally, it increasingly appeared in news and policy discourse, reaching and engaging with 
a more diverse group of actors, which in turn lent the distant future of geoengineering greater 
credibility through debate. The distant future of geoengineering thus had increased in ‘as-if’ 
reality precisely because it attracted opposition (which made this distant future actually more, not 
less, ambiguous and unclear), and in the absence of practice implementation. 
The Contribution of Synthesis to ‘As-If’ Reality: Articulation of Plan B (2006)
 In the third phase we find the first attempted synthesis of the opposition between 
Technofix and Human Hubris, through the articulation of a new imaginary termed Plan B. Unlike 
the previous two imaginaries, Plan B is not imported from the societal level, but rather it is 
locally articulated within the domain of climate change. We consider this to reflect the further 
concretization of the distant future of geoengineering, as actors are not just incorporating 
imaginaries from outside of this context, but they are also working to resolve the oppositions 
within the domain and articulate a new imaginary that is specific to geoengineering. 
The Ethos of Plan B is that humans are prudent pragmatists with responsibility for the 
planet, and an (imperfect) capacity to manipulate nature. Because of these imperfections, humans 
have a moral responsibility to be resourceful and identify solutions to try to solve problems with 
nature. Therefore, Plan B advocates a Position Towards Geoengineering of proceeding with 
research and experimentation. The Argument of Plan B is that although the preferred response to 
climate change is mitigation, it is unlikely that mitigation will happen fast enough or at the scale 
that is needed to avoid catastrophic climate change. Plan B therefore calls for a backup option, 
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although it acknowledges, like Human Hubris, that geoengineering may have unintended 
negative consequences. However, Plan B advocates that these can be better understood through 
further research, while Human Hubris argues for a pre-emptive moratorium on field 
experimentation and implementation research, seeing them as a distraction from the real 
problems driving climate change. As Plan B incorporates some elements of Human Hubris and 
others from Technofix, we see it as concretizing the distant future of geoengineering by offering 
an imaginary that partially overcomes some of the underlying opposition between these views: 
geoengineering is potentially risky and not the ideal solution, but it is necessary as we are 
running out of time to address the climate crisis, so we need to explore all the options. 
The local articulation of Plan B also indicates that the distant future of geoengineering 
was perceived as more credible, as it was worth working towards overcoming the underlying 
incompatible elements of the existing imaginaries in this space. Interestingly, climate scientists 
in this phase transitioned from raising concerns about geoengineering through invoking Human 
Hubris, to raising them by invoking Plan B. Many started to label themselves “reluctant 
supporters” of geoengineering, which we interpret as a way to reclaim a moral imperative from 
critiques of reckless hubris. A seminal article that articulated the Plan B imaginary was a 2006 
publication on geoengineering by Nobel Prize-winning climate scientist Paul Crutzen. In the 
article, Crutzen stated the Plan B Position that mitigation was the preferred option, but that it was 
unlikely to be enough, writing, “…the very best would be if emissions of the greenhouse gases 
could be reduced so much that the stratospheric sulfur release experiment would not need to take 
place. Currently, this looks like a pious wish” (Crutzen, 2006: 216). The Crutzen article is firmly 
rooted in a scientific Cosmology, like the Technofix imaginary, but is skeptical of human 
rationality and motivates the Stance from a pragmatist Ethos. It reflects the Plan B imaginary as 
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an attempt to resolve the opposition between Human Hubris and Technofix. Even the fact that 
Crutzen would engage in this debate was surprising at the time and added credibility to the 
distant future of geoengineering. As Crutzen later noted, the article served to “break the taboo” 
around talking about geoengineering. After the publication of the article, it became a touchpoint 
in the media through mentions such as the following in The Guardian: 
But, as Crutzen says, given the ‘grossly disappointing international political response’ to the 
idea that humans should reduce their greenhouse-gas emissions, it might be a good idea to 
start thinking now about climate engineering against some future emergency… Crutzen is 
really asking us to imagine the unimaginable, in the hope that we might wake up to the 
reality and start reducing carbon emissions.
*** Please insert Figure 2 around here ***
Plan B represented more than one third of the imaginaries reflected in the media articles 
in this phase, as shown in Figure 2. Additionally, 86% of coded mentions of Plan B co-occurred 
with another imaginary. The most frequent co-occurrence was between Plan B and Technofix 
(35%). Even though Plan B was articulated as a proposed synthesis of Technofix and Human 
Hubris, these two imaginaries were the second most frequently combined in the discourse (29%), 
showing that the introduction of Plan B did not provide a synthesis that fully resolved the 
underlying thesis and antithesis. An article in the International Herald Tribune provides an 
illustration of this, as it first introduced geoengineering from the perspective of Plan B and then 
provided the opposition from a lens of Human Hubris:
Few journals would publish [research on geoengineering technologies]. Few government 
agencies would pay for feasibility studies. But now, in a major reversal, some of the world’s 
most prominent scientists say the proposals deserve a serious look… Worried about a 
potential planetary crisis, these leaders are calling on governments and scientific groups to 
study exotic ways to reduce global warming, seeing them as possible fallback positions if the 
planet eventually needs a dose of emergency cooling. [Plan B] … Many scientists still deride 
geoengineering as an irresponsible dream with more risks and potential bad side effects than 
benefits; they call its extreme remedies a good reason to redouble efforts at reducing heat-
trapping gases like carbon dioxide. [Human Hubris]
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The distant future of geoengineering gained greater ‘as-if’ reality in this phase through 
the articulation of Plan B as a domain-specific imaginary that attempted to synthesize the 
opposition between Technofix and Human Hubris. Within the discussions that invoked Plan B, 
there is the assumption that a distant future of geoengineering has enough ‘as-if’ reality that we 
should start preparing today for that possible eventuality. However, Plan B still enables a 
consideration of geoengineering as (hopefully, or ideally) never ultimately needing to be 
deployed. Plan B is established primarily through its introduction by a prominent climate 
scientist, which lends credibility to the distant future of geoengineering. Despite the articulation 
of Plan B, however, the original two imaginaries, Technofix and Human Hubris, were not 
superseded or replaced after this proposed synthesis; instead, they remained integral to the 
discourse of geoengineering. In this phase, we begin to see an ecology of imaginaries of the 
distant future of geoengineering. 
Unresolved Opposition and New Attempted Synthesis: The Articulation of Governance 
First (2007 - 2009)
 A second proposed synthesis was put forward in the form of a new imaginary in the 
discourse surrounding geoengineering, Governance First. Because Plan B retained core 
assumptions and ideals of Technofix, the opposition with Human Hubris was not fully resolved. 
Governance First was articulated, therefore, in an attempt to reconcile and transcend the 
opposition between Plan B and Human Hubris. This further distillation of the dialectic process 
indicates continued concretization of a distant future of geoengineering, as it is articulated further 
in the specific domain. Additionally, the content of the Governance First imaginary itself is a 
sign of further concretization. While the previous imaginaries were primarily concerned with 
whether or not the distant future would include the deployment of geoengineering, Governance 
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First prioritizes the question of how a future with geoengineering would plausibly be governed, 
signaling greater treatment of geoengineering ‘as-if’ it were going to occur. 
The Ethos of Governance First is that humans have the scientific capacity to preserve the 
planet, but that they are often unable to cooperate for the common good. Unless these social 
flaws can be resolved, large-scale technological interventions are at risk of unilateral, and 
nefarious, deployment. The Governance First Ethos was reflected in a 2008 Guardian article 
about an assessment from a climate scientist at Stanford University:
In an overall assessment of the geo-engineering challenge, he notes that critics ask whether it 
is socially feasible to expect the many centuries of international political stability and co-
operation that would be needed to operate global scale schemes. He adds that the potential 
also exists for conflicts between nations if geo-engineering projects go wrong.
Governance First is built on the Corresponding Values of justice, equality, and collective 
solidarity by its insistence on the idea that the common good of humanity has to be governed by 
participatory political institutions. Like Plan B, Governance First recognizes that technological 
solutions are feasible and will likely be needed: this imaginary was more widely found as 
scientists increasingly reported that climate change was happening faster and at a more alarming 
rate than what had originally been predicted. Like the Human Hubris imaginary, Governance 
First also emphasizes the enormous risk to tinkering with the climate. The concern in the 
Governance First imaginary, however, is not that humans do not have the capacity to safely 
control the climate system (the primary premise of Human Hubris), but rather that they should 
not attempt to experiment or deploy these changes without a robust governance system in place. 
Governance First puts forth an Argument about the Role of Geoengineering that the barrier to 
moving forward is not a lack of knowledge about the planetary system, but rather a lack of 
operative global governance systems to oversee geoengineering. Governance First is still an 
Page 33 of 65 Academy of Management Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
incomplete synthesis because the core assumptions of technological solutions remain in 
opposition to Human Hubris.
In this phase, the frequency of news articles per year on geoengineering increased 
substantially, with over four times as many articles per year compared to the previous phase. We 
also see greater involvement of other actors in the discourse. Social scientists, policy experts, and 
activists all increasingly voiced imaginaries related to geoengineering in the news media. 
Credibility was also enhanced through the publication of governmental and non-governmental 
reports on geoengineering, which often invoked the Governance First imaginary. In 2009, 
climate and social scientists from the U.K.’s premier scientific association, the Royal Society, 
published a 98-page assessment on geoengineering which primarily emphasized aspects of the 
Governance First imaginary. For example, stating the following: 
It would be highly undesirable for geoengineering methods which involve activities or effects 
that extend beyond national boundaries (other than simply the removal of greenhouse gases 
from the atmosphere), to be deployed before appropriate governance mechanisms are in 
place (The Royal Society, 2009: ix). 
News articles would later credit this report as a turning point in the discourse, for 
example stating, “As concerns about global warming mount, the idea of deliberately altering the 
climate has been moving out of the realms of science fiction partly thanks to a 2009 report by the 
Royal Society” (Daily Telegraph, 2010). In parallel with this report, in 2009 social scientists 
published five high-level principles for the governance of geoengineering, called the “Oxford 
Principles, which emphasized that deployment should only occur “within an appropriate 
governance framework.” Activists, who had previously primarily utilized the Human Hubris 
imaginary, began to also invoke Governance First, as reflected in this quote by a leader of the 
ETC Group, a Canadian nongovernmental environmental organization: 
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In one technological controversy after another, it has become clear that governance processes 
that privilege techno-scientific knowledge and perspectives above all other forms of 
knowledge often deliver inequitable, unsafe and poorly informed judgments. (2009)
We see an increasingly differentiated ecology of imaginaries. At the same time that 
Governance First took off between Phase 3 and Phase 4 (>95% confidence level), discussions of 
Plan B decreased (>85% confidence level). This second attempted synthesis was gaining traction 
at the expense of the previously proposed one, which again reflects the ongoing dialectic process. 
The most common co-occurrence of imaginaries was the use of Plan B with Technofix; although 
there was a significant decrease (>95% confidence level) in frequency of this co-occurrence from 
the previous phase. Figure 3 shows co-occurrences of the imaginaries from Phases 3 to 5. We see 
a significant increase (>95% confidence level) of Governance First co-occurring with other 
imaginaries as 98% of occurrences of Governance First in the news co-occurred in the same 
article with another imaginary. As an example, in an article in The Guardian in 2009, Technofix 
was first invoked to vividly introduce possible geoengineering technologies and describe them in 
an almost “inevitable” manner: “The ideas, some of which, similar to cloud-seeding, involve 
firing massive amounts of chemicals into the atmosphere, can sound far-fetched, but they are 
racing up the agenda as pessimism grows about the likely course of global warming.” Next, in 
the same article, a policy expert voiced concerns aligned with Governance First: “Logic points 
to a big risk of unilateral geoengineering. Unlike controlling emissions, which requires collective 
action, most highly capable nations could deploy geoengineering systems on their own.” 
*** Please insert Figure 3 about here ***
We also found that climate scientists began to invoke Governance First. This is a 
continuation of the dialectic process, as we saw this actor group first discussed the distant future 
exclusively through the Technofix imaginary, then juxtaposed it with Human Hubris as an 
Page 35 of 65 Academy of Management Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
imaginary of critique, then broadened their discourse to include discussions of Plan B, and 
eventually came to invoke the imaginary of Governance First. Thus, the dialectic process and the 
change in imaginaries was not only occurring across actor groups, but also within them. 
In this phase, the distant future of geoengineering gained greater ‘as-if’ reality as 
Governance First was generated as an attempt to resolve the continued opposition between Plan 
B and Human Hubris. Both the prominence of Governance First, along with its content of being 
concerned with how geoengineering could be governed in advance of its deployment, further 
concretized the distant future of geoengineering. Further concretization was also reflected in the 
fact that climate scientists continued to engage in the dialectic process that attempted to resolve 
underlying oppositions between the existing imaginaries. Additionally, we see greater credibility 
of this distant future reflected in the wider group of actors articulating imaginaries as well as 
through the publication of reports by governments and non-governmental agencies that 
increasingly treated geoengineering and its governance as worthy of their attention. 
From Synthesis to New Antithesis: Conspiracy of Elite Control (2010 - 2016)
 In the last phase of our study, we find an increased prominence of a new imaginary, 
Conspiracy of Elite Control. While in the previous two phases, Plan B and Governance First 
were locally articulated, being based primarily on attempted syntheses between existing 
imaginaries within the domain, Conspiracy of Elite Control reflects a wider societal-level 
imaginary, as was the case with Technofix and Human Hubris. The Privileged Epistemic Domain 
in Conspiracy of Elite Control is the rejection of scientific knowledge and political authority and 
an elevation of lay expertise as an equally valid alternative to experts. While the imaginary’s 
Position, which is opposed to geoengineering, is similar to others’, its Diagnosis of the Present 
Situation is very different. It proposes that geoengineering is already happening and its Proposed 
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Solution is to empower people to expose this secret and disrupt existing power structures. 
Conspiracy of Elite Control treats the distant future as if it were a present-day reality. 
When this imaginary appeared in the news, it was primarily through letters to the editor 
rather than articles by journalists. Even though Conspiracy of Elite Control increases in this 
phase (confidence level >90%), it remains largely outside of the primary, or multi-actor, sites of 
discourse; additionally, it is rarely mentioned in relation to other imaginaries. However, central 
to this imaginary is a critique of institutional actors, especially the governmental actors that are 
central to Governance First. For example, one article started by noting “alarm over the CIA’s 
part-funding of a National Academy of Sciences report,” then discussed historical British 
military trials “to produce artificial clouds to bamboozle German flying machines during World 
War I” and the US military’s previous “Operation Popeye [that] increased rainfall by about 30% 
over Vietnam,” before ending by noting theories that a US “secretive Alaskan facility has 
manipulated weather patterns with its investigation of the ionosphere” (Mail & Guardian, 2015).
Conspiracy of Elite Control was articulated in detail by organizations such as 
Geoengineering Watch, a group founded in 2010 based on the idea that “Volumes of data, lab 
tests and video footage, from all over the globe, make clear the conclusion that aerosol spraying 
has been an ongoing lethal reality.” The group remained active throughout the remainder of our 
period of study and it continued to argue that geoengineering was already being deployed and 
needed to be stopped. In a 2014 speech, the leader of Geoengineering Watch stated:
This is going on right now. We’ve verified this again and again. The global elite and the 
bankers are involved with this. People ask, who is doing this? I say, who is doing everything? 
Who prints the money? It all goes back to the money (Wingington, 2014).
The ecology of imaginaries persisted in this phase as different actor groups invoked 
different imaginaries. There were an average of 233 articles on geoengineering published per 
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year, the greatest number thus far, which indicates further credibility of the distant future of 
geoengineering. The publication of popular press books by prominent climate and social 
scientists, as well as by journalists, conveyed the idea that geoengineering futures were taking on 
more of an ‘as-if’ reality that deserved to be in the public sphere. We identified 12 books that 
were explicitly focused on geoengineering, and they were all published in this phase.
Another prominent change during this time was the decrease in the Plan B imaginary 
(99% confidence level) and the growth in Governance First (95% confidence level). In fact, 
mentions of Governance First surpassed those of Plan B, reflecting that this second attempted 
synthesis was gaining more traction in the discourse than the previously proposed synthesis, 
which again indicates further concretization of a distant future of geoengineering. Additionally, 
imaginaries of geoengineering moved beyond policy and scientific circles and were increasingly 
present in wider debates that included non-governmental organizations, activists, ethicists, lay 
citizens, journalists, and entrepreneurs. In this phase, there was a decrease in the reference to 
climate scientists in the news media (99% confidence level), while social scientists’ involvement 
in the discourse increased (95% confidence level). Social scientists often focused on Governance 
First. For example, in a 2012 speech, the author of the Oxford Principles argued that the 
acceptability of geoengineering is “highly dependent on resolving the serious and complex 
governance issues.” Activists continued to primarily utilize the Human Hubris imaginary, 
occasionally paired with a critique of Technofix. For example, climate activist and author Naomi 
Klein invoked Human Hubris in a 2012 op-ed in the New York Times, writing:
The risks are huge. Ocean fertilization could trigger dead zones and toxic tides. And multiple 
simulations have predicted that mimicking the effects of a volcano would interfere with 
monsoons in Asia and Africa, potentially threatening water and food security for billions of 
people. 
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The top co-occurrences in this phase were both with Governance First (with Technofix 
and Human Hubris). Governance First was found the least on its own in the news articles. 
Together, these findings indicate the continued debate between this proposed synthesis and other 
imaginaries. Figure 3 visually shows the transition as the most frequent co-occurrences in the 
media shifted from Plan B in Phase 3 to Governance First in Phase 5. Despite the temporal 
changes in the discourse through the local articulation of two proposed syntheses (Plan B and 
Governance First) as well as the importation of an additional societal-level imaginary 
(Conspiracy of Elite Control), the underlying opposition between Technofix and Human Hubris 
persisted. As an example, in a 2013 debate at the University of Oxford between a climate 
scientist who espoused a Technofix imaginary and a social scientist, the social scientist invoked 
Human Hubris through the following: 
I don't believe the real climate will behave like the model climate at scales that matter for 
people and at which the political, legal, and ethical repercussions are felt… Geoengineering 
would be like playing a game of Russian roulette.
In this phase, we also see the first attempt to test the assumptions of some geoengineering 
technologies outside of simulations and laboratories. Off the coast of Canada, an entrepreneur 
attempted to spread 100 tons of iron sulfate in the Pacific Ocean to examine the technological 
and commercial viability of ocean fertilization as a carbon dioxide removal method. The attempt 
was met with immediate pushback and ruled illegal by a Canadian court before it could be fully 
executed. Protests blocked another experiment, which would have pumped water droplets into 
the atmosphere from a tethered balloon.in the U.K., before it even commenced. There is of yet, a 
moratorium on even small-scale experiments that would create an experiential basis for 
geoengineering. Nevertheless, in this final phase, geoengineering continued to gain ‘as-if’ reality 
as a new imaginary imported from the societal level, Conspiracy of Elite Control treated 
geoengineering as if it were already happening. Additionally, during this phase, debate continued 
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to broaden, not only within and across actor groups, but also across individuals who discussed 
multiple imaginaries. Finally, there was evidence of increased credibility of the distant future of 
geoengineering, through the publication of popular press books on the subject and independent 
actors pursuing experiments of the associated technologies. 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT: INTEGRATION AND IMPLICATIONS 
We have developed the concept of distant future as a new way of seeing the future and its 
connection to orienting action. Distance refers to how close a future is to experience and 
convention, not to the time horizon of when it is envisioned to materialize. We argue that 
previous management research has largely treated the future in an undifferentiated way and 
implicitly focused on variants of the near future. The phenomenology of the near future is 
characterized by uncertainty and risk and correspondingly is focused on problems of 
expectations and prediction based on existing knowledge and experience. Yet, some future-
related problems, such as grand challenges, extend beyond near future concerns and require an 
understanding of distant future processes. The distant future is characterized by ambiguity and 
hence poses the problem of imagining what hypothetically might be and raises the question of 
how such imagined possibilities may ever be considered real enough to orient collective action. 
The distinction between near and distant futures is thus not a matter of just extending the time 
horizon, but it points to qualitatively different processes of envisioning the future and acting on 
it. Through the case of geoengineering, we find that societal-level imaginaries influenced the 
initial development of a distant future and that the projection of that future was followed by a 
dialectic process that attracted oppositional imaginaries and attempted syntheses. The 
controversy that came about from these oppositions prevented immediate coordinated action, but 
at the same time it made the distant future of geoengineering increasingly concrete and credible, 
allowing it to acquire an ‘as-if’ reality in the absence of any substantial implementation. 
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A Model of Creating ‘As-If’ Reality for a Distant Future
To integrate our empirical observations at a more abstract level, we present a model of 
how a distant future is imagined and gains ‘as-if’ reality at the collective level. The model is 
shown in Figure 4. Our first research question corresponds to the first step in the model: how do 
distant futures come to be? As shown in the left half of the figure, this initial imagining of a 
distant future comes about through the importation of a societal-level imaginary to the domain 
level. Initially, actors draw on societal-level imaginaries that reflect deep, pervasive ideas about 
humanity in the form of a cosmology and moral basis, but lack explicit statements related to 
potential futures within a specific domain. Why do we observe imaginaries as central to this 
process, over other concepts, such as identities or goals? The key is their ability to coordinate 
collective imagination under conditions of high ambiguity: as deep cultural structures (Sewell, 
1992) imaginaries are pervasive and orient imagination through moral cosmologies, yet diffuse 
enough to afford flexibility in imagining by diverse individual actors. The societal level 
imaginary allows actors to “make the leap” into seeing a distant future that breaks from current 
discourse and experience within a domain (which might have been previously focused on near 
future processes such as extrapolation of past practices and risk assessments). The cosmology 
and moral basis of the societal-level imaginary are applied to a domain through the articulation 
of a present-to-future link and a normative stance towards the future. Imaginaries thus reduce an 
issue to its moral and cosmological assumptions, and then extend these out to alternative 
possibilities, a process that corresponds to the model of generating new concepts in cognitive 
psychology (e.g. Ward, 1994) and alternative futures at the societal level (Levitas, 2013). The 
importation and articulation process highlights that distant futures are constructed as domain-
specific but that they are still abstract and stylized representations hinged to cultural structures. 
*** Please insert Figure 4 about here ***
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Our second research question corresponds to the subsequent step in the model: How does 
a distant future gain ‘as-if’ reality? Our central insight is that a dialectic process is the engine for 
the increasing ‘as-if’ reality of a distant future. We find that a distant future acts as a 
motivational pull or repellent to other actors, prompting them to think through a hypothetical 
future, or critique it if it conflicts with their morality and cosmology. One would normally expect 
a future to become more concrete and credible through gradual implementation via robust action 
(Ferraro, et al., 2015); but for distant futures there is no experience upon which to build. Instead, 
‘as-if’ reality is advanced by the often oppositional structure of elementary social imaginaries 
(documented in anthropological work by Levi-Strauss (1966/1962) and Douglas (1966)) and 
actors work to propose alternatives, articulating new imaginaries in opposition to, or as proposed 
syntheses of, existing imaginaries, which then result in new interpretations and critiques. 
Ironically, debate and critiques add specificity and nuance to the distant future, thus making it 
more concrete, and it draws in responses from new participants, making it more credible. 
This model suggests that the dialectic process does not produce a consensus or 
compromise for implementing the distant future. Rather, the dialectic process is ongoing within 
the domain, and creates a proliferation of interim positions, without producing a true synthesis in 
the dialectic sense that would resolve the opposition of the initial imaginaries. We observed 
empirically in the case of geoengineering that proposed syntheses addressed aspects of the 
opposition but left others unresolved. For example, Plan B and Governance First maintained the 
Technofix core - the underlying belief that technology can effectively address the climate crisis. 
We suggest that one reason for the absence of a true synthesis in the dialectic sense is that such a 
synthesis cannot arise within the domain (in our case climate change), but only at the societal 
level of elementary imaginaries. Because imaginaries of geoengineering remain hinged to 
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societal imaginaries, local syntheses are necessarily incomplete. In addition, the gradual increase 
in the distant future’s ‘as-if’ reality invites new critiques through the importation of additional 
societal-level oppositions, which we saw through the importation of the imaginary of Conspiracy 
of Elite Control in response to the proposed Governance First synthesis. 
The dialectic process, therefore, results in an increasingly differentiated ecology of 
imaginaries (shown on the right in figure 4). This ecology of imaginaries further prompts more 
fine-grained discourse and increases the salience of concrete concerns and the credibility of the 
future as more people relate to it. In our case, we saw, for example the expansion of discourse 
from scientific articles, the original site of geoengineering discourse, to government reports, 
popular press books, and public debates. The discourse around the imagined future gradually 
shifted from ideological and principled concerns, which are central to evaluating distant futures, 
to also include questions of feasibility and practicality that are central to near futures. The distant 
future (of geoengineering) is increasingly being talked about ‘as if’ it were a reality. 
Implications for Studying the Future
Our study extends research on organizing for future-oriented action. By identifying and 
focusing on distant futures, we complement work that has typically employed concepts 
associated with the near future, such as legitimating temporal narratives or applying discount 
rates to future options (e.g., Gioia, Corley, & Fabbri, 2002; Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013; Garud, 
Schildt, & Lant, 2014; Flammer & Bansal, 2017). Our work proposes that futures can be 
constructed for alternative purposes, and that in turn there is a need to revisit and broaden how 
knowledge relates to envisioning the future as well as how controversy and consensus can play a 
role in realizing futures in action.   
Instrumental and expressive roles of the future. The focus on the near future as an 
attempt to optimize choices between alternative options under conditions of incomplete 
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knowledge is well represented in existing management research. Garud et al. (2014), for 
example, emphasize the centrality of entrepreneurial narratives that set cognitive expectations 
(about future states of the world) and pragmatic expectations (about the value of those states to 
the firm) for nascent ventures’ legitimacy and ability to acquire resources. Similarly, Flammer 
and Bansal (2017) show that incentives for executives to consider longer time horizons leads 
them to pursue more long-term investment strategies, presumably because they discount 
expected return in the future less than they would otherwise. And Slawinski and Bansal (2015) 
identify practices that allow some firms to manage the tensions between short-term and long-
term expectations in their decision making.
A view of the distant future suggests, however, that futures are not only considered for 
the purpose of forming expectations and managing uncertainty. They are also constructed as 
expressions of values, beliefs, and desires, giving shape to hopes and fears and making sense of 
moral ambiguities. The importance of imaginaries in envisioning and making sense of the distant 
future shows that people relate to the future not only in an instrumental way, but also in an 
expressive way, to affirm and give shape to collective hopes, fears, and desires that are 
affectively salient but practically remote. Distant futures thus do not reduce but increase 
uncertainty about future states. They expand a diverging set of possibilities, which makes 
forming expectations about them more complex, and they introduce higher level principles and 
assumptions, which can unsettle conventionally agreed upon goals and preferences. Giving 
consideration to the distant future thus brings into focus the generative effects of engaging with 
the future in organizations. 
Envisioning radical alternatives and critique. The expressive purpose of distant futures 
is particularly salient in envisioning alternatives that critique the status quo. These critiques are 
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the precursors for processes such as breaking away from institutionalized practices, which is 
central to institutional entrepreneurship and the emergence of new fields (Battilana, Leca & 
Boxenbaum, 2009; Zietsma, et al., 2017). This is especially true for more radical change efforts, 
such as alternative forms of capitalism (Adler, 2016), systemic sustainability in the anthropocene 
(Ehrenfeld & Hoffman, 2013), breakthrough solutions to grand challenges (Ferraro, et al. 2015), 
or radical innovation and disruptive entrepreneurship (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Fisher, 2012). 
The construction of more distant futures and their taking on an ‘as-if’ reality is a 
precondition for these projects, yet the existing research says very little about how such 
alternatives are conceived of and considered in the first place. Previous work identifies as 
conditions for more radical entrepreneurial projects a systemic understanding of problems (e.g. 
Schad & Bansal, 2018) and a deep understanding of tensions (e.g. Raisch, Hargrave, & Van de 
Ven, 2018). At the same time, much of the corresponding research employs models grounded in 
near future processes, such as the recombination of existing knowledge and learning from 
experience. These processes draw on rather than question institutional contexts. For example, 
work on effectuation processes locates the source of entrepreneurial efforts in individual and 
organizational experience (Fisher, 2012), which ignores the orienting role of societal imaginaries 
in coordinating these efforts at the collective level. Research on cultural entrepreneurship 
(Lounsbury & Glynn, 2019) on the other hand, does take such cultural context into account, but 
until very recently has equally focused on symbolic resources and cultural legacies that are 
experientially accessible in the present, over the more projective quality of distant futures.  
The distinction can be illustrated in the domain of climate change. Many mitigation 
strategies, such as the advancement of renewable energy production or smart metering, develop 
through incremental changes to existing processes and learning from previous experience. Even 
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when proposals are bold in scale or aggressive in timescale, they develop near futures that are 
construed in continuity with experiential knowledge. At the surface, many other types of 
proposed technological solutions can be seen as aligned with the Technofix imaginary that also 
gave rise to geoengineering. However, while both mitigation strategies and geoengineering often 
focus on technology as part of the solution, the types and use of the potential technologies in 
geoengineering represent a discontinuity from experience, which is not the case with mitigation.
The distinctive phenomenology of distant futures thus offers a stronger foundation for 
understanding the distinctive emergence of critiques and true alternatives that are at the heart of 
systemic alternatives and radical innovation in a variety of contexts. The hypothetical and 
fictional nature of distant futures may not have immediate value for action or uncertainty 
reduction, and it is thus tempting to dismiss distant futures as inconsequential fantasy or utopia. 
But they are crucial for breaking with experiential knowledge and conventional practices, for 
seeing problems and opportunities that do not fit existing frameworks. Existing work on 
imaginaries has acknowledged their role in divergent evaluations of existing practices (Levy & 
Spicer, 2013; Roux-Rosier et al., 2018; Wright, et al., 2013), but research on their origins within 
a domain is extremely limited (for an exception in the context of permaculture, see Roux-Rosier, 
et al, 2018). One effect of even unsuccessful entrepreneurial efforts based on distant futures is to 
articulate an implicit critique of the status quo that may undermine its legitimacy and pave the 
way for change. Even if geoengineering were to be ultimately discarded, it has, by acquiring an 
‘as-if’ reality, offered a critique of mitigation strategies that may lead to more radical changes. 
Forms of knowing in future-oriented action. The collective knowledge that supports 
constructing a distant future goes beyond the forms of knowledge normally considered pertinent 
to action. The expectations of the future that are central to near futures are based on declarative 
Page 46 of 65Academy of Management Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
forms of knowledge, knowledge that can be communicated and processed as stable facts, rules 
and attributes. Constructing the distant future, by contrast, relies on deep moral bases and 
cosmologies that reflect belief systems, ethos and values that are difficult to articulate 
analytically; they are represented and accessed more as feelings and images than as articulated in 
concrete form (Lizardo, 2017; Castoriadis, 1975/1987). Imaginaries encapsulate knowledge in 
the form of ideals based on fiction and fantasy rather than practical experience or analytic 
knowledge. Imaginaries are particularly important at the collective level, whereby the moral 
basis and cosmology enables many people to coalesce around a shared distant future, even in the 
absence of action towards it.
The ethos and values at the center of imaginaries also bring attention to the moral 
underpinnings of changes and innovation. Radical entrepreneurship, regardless of whether it is 
institutional, technological, or commercial, is tied to moral ideals, through an entrepreneurial 
ethos that is derived from societal imaginaries (Voronov & Weber, 2016). A moral and 
ideological grounding makes distant futures deeply emotional, which has implications for how 
people mobilize to act on them. For example, a near-future focus within the domain of climate 
change can be found in many of the approaches that have been taken to date, such as the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports and climate forecasting, and in 
innovations that fall in line with the dominant ideological beliefs about the climate and the 
economy, like carbon taxes or markets. We are thus not arguing that near future thinking is not 
able to lead to innovation. However, for an approach to break with a domain’s institutionalized 
assumptions, it is likely to be grounded in distant futures that are fueled by moral ideals rather 
than in near futures that are derived from assessments or extrapolations. Such radical thinking 
may be a necessary component of making the leap towards addressing large-scale, complex, 
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multi-actor grand challenges like the climate crisis, but this also means that solutions will be 
evaluated on moral grounds and are not reducible to scientific assessments based on objective 
measures. One implication of the form of knowledge used in constructing distant futures is that 
futures are evaluated based on ideology and resonance with moral and cosmological principles 
rather than factual and practical considerations. This may be one reason why conventional 
models of science communication that rely on rational persuasion and scientific evidence have 
not been fully successful in the context of climate change (Hoffman, 2011).
The role of consensus and controversy in future-oriented action. Existing work on 
future-oriented action in management focuses on the necessity of developing consensus and a 
shared understanding of goals and how to accomplish them to generate coordinated action (e.g., 
Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012; Cornelissen & Clarke, 2010). For example, while opposition was 
highlighted by Kaplan and Orlikowski (2013) as a component for catalyzing greater strategic 
shifts, eventual agreement amongst actors, even if temporary, was key to action. Thus, for near 
futures, debate may well improve the quality of ultimate action by stimulating a more thorough 
evaluation of the feasibility and consequences of action, and facilitate the search for alternative 
solutions. But work to date has emphasized that consensus or compromise is necessary for 
mobilizing collective action around a path forward. For acting on a near future, controversy is 
thus assumed at best of temporary value, but primarily as leading to paralysis.
In contrast, for distant futures, the challenge for collective action is not so much deciding 
on which of several options to pursue, but around whether a proposed idea should even be 
considered an option in the first place. In this context, debate is a process that propels the distant 
future toward becoming part of the set of possible solutions in the domain. Contestation prompts 
elaboration of hypothetical possibilities, increasing concreteness. Through multiple actors 
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entering debate, the distant future gains credibility as a potential solution that should be 
considered, even when actors disagree. Our empirical case does not show the emergence of a 
dominant imaginary (as in Levy & Spicer, 2013), nor does it show a plurality of juxtaposed 
imaginaries (as in Roux-Rosier et al., 2018). Instead, we find that an ecology of imaginaries 
develops through a co-constructive, dialectic relationship. Thus, as an unintended consequence 
of contesting the initial interpretation of geoengineering, debate actually increased ‘as-if’ reality, 
even in the absence of actual realization and when many people were strongly opposed to any 
implementation of the proposed ideas. To contest and debate a proposed distant future, 
opponents have to relate the future to their own morality, cosmology, and experience, so that 
they begin to “inhabit it in their mind,” to use Beckert’s (2016) words. In advocating for a distant 
future, it may thus be beneficial to stimulate debate and different perspectives rather than 
suppress them in the interest of urgency or ideological closure.
Controversy and opposition may be particularly important in moving a distant future 
towards action in settings without central authority (i.e., outside of the hierarchical control of 
organizations) or in the absence of settled knowledge (e.g. grand challenges). The scale, 
complexity, radical uncertainty, and ambiguity of grand challenges require sustained efforts that 
go beyond single actor groups, technologies, or organizations (Ferraro, et al., 2015; Howard-
Grenville, et al. 2016). Ferraro and colleagues (2015) argue that addressing grand challenges 
requires robust action: a participatory architecture of diverse actors, discursive material that 
sustains different interpretations and evaluation criteria, and distributed experimentation. They 
suggest robust action is a deliberate strategy that organizations can develop and employ. Given 
the lack of clarity or knowledge of potential responses to grand challenges, we see contestation 
and debate about the distant future as potentially central to robust action and radical solutions. 
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And the dialectic process that enables an ecology of imaginaries to develop in a given distant 
future, set in motion by the oppositional structure of societal imaginaries, is likely to be central to 
building the discursive material through which diverse actors negotiate oppositions within a 
domain. The process of articulating theses, antitheses, and syntheses of the distant future builds 
the ‘as-if’ reality that is needed to allow the tempered experimentation required for robust action.
Towards a Research Agenda on the Distant Future in Management 
In building theory around the distant future and identifying the role of imaginaries in it, 
as well as in outlining the dimensions and components that make up imaginaries, our work opens 
up new paths for future research. As we consider the distinction between near and distant futures, 
it will be worthwhile to further explore their relationship and interplay. For example, within the 
domain of climate change, the distant future of geoengineering is prompted by and relies on the 
near future of climate forecasts and models. In many cases, it is likely that the same domain 
could prompt both near and distant futures. For example, on the one hand, an issue like 
population growth reflects a relatively straightforward near future based on a long-range forecast 
(e.g. population projections for 2060), but on the other hand, it prompts an uncertain distant 
future based more on ideologies and identities, an image of a more crowded world, even at a 
shorter timeframe (e.g. sprawling cities that are over capacity by 2030). It is possible that we 
would find more utopian or dystopian futures in a post-truth era that places value on belief 
systems and ideologically-driven evaluations. 
Future research could also explore the pace and roadblocks of moving towards ‘as-if’ 
reality. What moves the progression of attempted syntheses along or enables them to more or 
less overcome underlying oppositions? When may a distant future reflect shorter or longer 
phases of attempted resolution? Our work suggests that pressure from the domain level, in our 
case the growing scientific evidence that climate change is occurring faster and more intensely 
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than initially thought, may have triggered proposed resolutions of oppositions. Alternatively, one 
could imagine a more extended dialectic process could have unfolded if revised climate models 
had shown that the impacts of climate change were projected to be slower. Importantly, there 
also remains an open question of how a future transitions from distant to near. As we study 
geoengineering, we observed its transition from fantasy to gaining greater ‘as-if’ reality. As 
climate change impacts escalate, and geoengineering debates continue, when and how might the 
dynamics change to prompt action on a large scale? 
Our work shows that the process of imagining a distant future is strongly shaped by 
societal-level imaginaries, yet what prompts and enables the construction of a distant future 
remains an open question. For example, is dissatisfaction with the present or expected near future 
needed to begin to imagine a distant future? And is some degree of social closure needed for 
radical alternatives that run counter conventional views of the future to gain momentum? Our 
case suggests that imaginaries related to geoengineering emerged in part because scientists were 
concerned that climate change impacts could not be sufficiently addressed through traditional 
mitigation efforts such as reduction targets and switching fuels. This idea is aligned with work on 
imaginaries that suggest that crises and dissatisfaction with the status quo are precursors to 
building alternative imaginaries of the future. And geoengineering technologies also were 
initially proposed in the relatively closed community of scientific experts, with norms of 
counterfactual thinking and protection from immediate scrutiny over practicality or societal 
implications. Whether conditions like these are common or necessary for the emergence of 
distant futures is a matter of empirical research. In this regard, it is important to contextualize the 
insights of our study of geoengineering by researching the dynamics of distant futures in other 
settings and theorizing differences and parallels. Distant futures are created and pursued in a 
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variety of domains and settings. These include the ‘sites of hyperprojectivity’ described by 
Mische (2014), which involve deliberate gatherings by futurists, but they are also relevant within 
audacious ‘moonshot’ commercial entrepreneurship such as Elon Musk’s private space 
exploration venture, and the development of futuristic technologies like artificial intelligence or 
bionic enhancement. Many of these phenomena share with geoengineering an appearance of 
being bold and audacious but also disconcerting and morally objectionable to some audiences. 
Management research should grapple with such unconventional phenomena, and begin to 
see them as central to theories of management and organizations, rather than exceptional or 
exotic. The constant imagination and pursuit of distant futures has been repeatedly identified as a 
central dynamic of capitalism and in need of more study (Schumpeter, 1934; Beckert, 2016). 
Neither pure fantasy nor extrapolations of reality, the concept of the distant future provides a lens 
into how utopian proposals, like geoengineering, matter for creating our actual future. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of the Distant Future
Characteristics Distant future Near future
Knowledge limitations Ambiguity, radical uncertainty, 
unknown possibilities
Uncertainty, risk, probability of 
different known states to occur
Construal level High level, abstract, stylized Low level, concrete, practical, 
nuanced
Temporal 
representation
Leap, discontinuity from present 
and past experience
Continuity, future extends from 
present and past experience
Conception (processes 
for generating future 
states)
Imagination based on ideologies, 
desired identities, principles
Extrapolation, predictions based on 
assessment of the present, 
calculation and forecasts
Evaluation (set of 
futures considered)
Possibilities, what might be, 
fantasy and fictional 
hypotheticals
Probability, confidence of 
happening, feasibility, practicality of 
accomplishing
Table 2. From Fantasy to ‘As-if’ Reality
Fantasy ‘As-if’ reality
Purpose Expressive role in giving shape 
to ethos, ideals, desires, and 
myths; no expected action to 
realize it
Practical role in orienting 
action to accomplish goals and 
create/prevent consequences; 
creates desire to act
Orientation toward the 
future
(Credibility)
Playful, without consequence, 
hypothetical thought 
experiment
Serious as a possibility, 
consequential and demanding a 
response, consequences of 
realization deserve assessment
Representation of the future 
(Concreteness)
Image-like (vivid but vague, 
stylized and incomplete), 
disassociated with experiential 
reality
Embedded in knowledge 
systems (analytic, complete, 
detailed), associated with 
experiential reality, discussed 
alongside other options
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Table 3. Typology of Imaginaries
Dimen-
sion
1. Moral Basis
(Motivational and evaluation principles)
2. Cosmology
(How the world can be 
explained and experienced)
3. Present-To-Future Link
(How to get from here to there)
4. Stance
(Towards the future)
Sub-Com-
ponent
Ethos Values Evaluation 
Criteria
Privileged 
Epistemic 
Domains
Authori-
tative 
Actors
Diagnosis and 
Metaphor for the 
Present
Positive 
Vision of the 
Future
Narrative 
of How to 
Get There
Role of 
Geoengineering
Position 
toward Geo-
engineering
Proposed 
Solution
Technofix Humanity as rational 
and competent 
custodian of earth. 
Rule over nature 
thanks to scientific 
genius and human 
ingenuity. Nature as 
malleable and a 
resource in the 
service of humanity. 
Experts with 
knowledge and the 
faculty for rational 
action (scientists, 
engineers) have a 
moral responsibility 
to step in.
Progress; 
human 
agency; 
rationality
Status of the 
actor (expert, 
esp. 
scientific); 
consistency 
with basic 
scientific 
principles and 
method; 
rationality of 
arguments 
(non-
emotional); 
elegance, 
boldness and 
efficiency of 
technological 
solutions
Science, 
technology & 
engineering
Scientists & 
engineers
Climate change is a 
technical problem 
whose root cause is 
human emissions 
into the 
atmosphere; the 
amount of 
emissions and the 
pace of climate 
change make 
alternative ways of 
addressing 
emissions less 
expedient.
Metaphor: 
Thermostat of earth 
needs adjusting
Earth and 
humanity 
have been 
saved from 
catastrophic 
climate 
change; 
people have 
gained 
greater 
control over 
the 
environment
Experts 
develop 
rational 
solutions to 
a technical 
problem, 
which are 
implemente
d to 
overcome 
the 
challenge 
facing 
humanity 
without 
requiring 
sacrifices to 
modern life.
Geoengineering can 
solve climate change 
with human ingenuity 
and technology. 
Humanity can achieve 
climate control. 
Geoengineering is in 
principle no different 
than the emissions 
that caused climate 
change, both are 
human interventions. 
Hence, we have 
already 'engineered' 
the climate and there 
is no pre-human state 
to go back to.
Acceleration: 
In favor of 
near-term 
development 
and 
deployment.
Large scale 
interventions in 
the atmosphere. 
Scientifically, 
they are 
expected to 
work. To 
develop 
corresponding 
technologies, we 
need research 
and 
experimentation 
today, to move 
to near-term 
"controlled" 
implementation.
Human 
Hubris
Humanity as a 
dilettante when it 
comes to nature, a 
humble 'guest' of 
nature, without a 
capacity to fully 
understand or 
control it. Nature as 
independent of 
humanity, a self-
regulating system 
that has created a 
favorable 
equilibrium for 
humans (human 
dependence). 
People's moral 
responsibility is to 
limit the impact of 
their activities 
(minimal footprint), 
to allow nature to 
take care of itself.
Purity of 
nature; 
modesty; 
precaution; 
preservatio
n
Minimizing 
human 
footprint on 
nature; 
systemic 
analysis and 
understanding 
of effects; 
reversibility of 
technological 
solutions
Ethics, 
philosophy of 
science, social 
science, 
ecology
Social 
movements, 
ethicists, 
social and 
natural 
scientists, 
policy 
makers
The root cause of 
climate change is 
humanity's modern 
lifestyles that do 
not respect 
planetary 
boundaries 
(consumption, 
technological 
intervention). 
Technological fixes 
do not address the 
systemic causes, 
and often times 
make them worse. 
The risks of 
geoengineering are 
unknowable, 
incalculable and 
irreversible.
Metaphor: 
Pandora's box, 
Frankenstein's 
monster
Nature is 
restored to 
equilibrium 
Without the 
distraction 
of 
geoengineer
ing 
technologies 
(or silver 
bullets), 
humanity 
returns to 
more 
aggressive 
efforts to 
reduce and 
limit its 
climate 
footprint, 
and to 
adapting to 
any 
temporary 
changes 
until those 
efforts bear 
fruit.
Geoengineering 
interventions might 
address symptoms of 
climate change, but 
they compensate for 
human impacts rather 
than eliminate the 
causes. The effect of 
human intervention in 
complex natural 
systems is always 
unpredictable, 
because humans 
cannot fully 
understand and 
control them. So 
interventions cause 
unanticipated new 
problems. The only 
way to address 
human-caused 
changes is to reduce 
human impact to 
enable natural 
systems to return to 
equilibrium.
Moratorium: 
Geoengineeri
ng represents 
a moral 
hazard in 
distracting 
from much 
needed 
mitigation 
efforts.
Re-focus 
attention on 
mitigation 
through 
behavior and 
policy changes. 
We already have 
many 
technologies to 
reduce 
emissions - we 
need to focus 
efforts on these 
instead of 
placing false 
hopes in a future 
technology that 
is potentially 
dangerous and 
most likely 
ineffective.
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Plan B Humanity as a 
prudent pragmatist 
with responsibility 
for the planet, and 
an (imperfect) 
capacity to 
manipulate nature. 
Nature is viewed as 
a precious resource 
to humanity that has 
been knocked out of 
equilibrium by 
human activity. 
Because of human 
imperfection, we 
have a moral 
responsibility to be 
identify many 
solutions so that one 
of them may solve 
the problem. Not 
considering 
alternatives bears 
great risk and is 
irresponsible.
Pragmatis
m; 
security; 
pursuit of 
knowledge
Empirical 
support and 
data-driven 
evidence; 
undogmatic 
pragmatism; 
innovation and 
resourcefulnes
s; practicality, 
comprehensive
ness and 
likelihood of 
success of 
technological 
solutions
Science, 
technology & 
engineering, 
policy
Scientists, 
engineers 
and policy 
makers
Climate change is a 
technical and 
societal problem 
whose root cause is 
human emissions 
into the 
atmosphere; the 
pace of climate 
change requires 
fast coordinated 
societal responses; 
such responses 
have not been 
accomplished at 
sufficient scale in 
mitigation efforts. 
This slowness risks 
missing a point of 
no return for 
climate change.
Metaphor: The 
11th hour savior; 
an insurance policy
Earth and 
humanity 
have been 
saved from 
catastrophic 
climate 
change. This 
temporary 
relief gives 
them time to 
develop more 
long term 
solutions. 
Gradual 
research 
increases 
knowledge 
about tech 
options and 
their 
feasibility. 
Cost and 
effectivenes
s can then 
be rationally 
assessed in 
compare-
son to 
alternatives. 
If geo-
engineering 
technologies 
are needed, 
they can 
then be 
used.
While the preferred 
response to climate 
change is mitigation 
(through significant 
emissions reduction), 
it is now clear that it 
is uncertain or even 
unlikely that 
sufficient action for 
mitigation will 
happen in time. We 
need a backup option, 
or Plan B, in case 
other efforts fail. The 
stakes are too high not 
to prepare a Plan B, 
even if it is never 
used.
Experimentat
ion: Proceed 
with caution, 
but need for 
more research 
and empirical 
experimentati
on to find 
feasible 
solutions 
before 
possible 
deployment.
Explore the 
possibility of 
large-scale 
interventions in 
the atmosphere, 
oceans, and 
land, to assess 
their promise. 
We need 
research to 
understand the 
options, but 
nothing should 
be implemented 
unless all other 
efforts fail.
Gover-
nance 
First
Humanity as 
scientifically 
capable of 
preserving the 
planet, but unable to 
cooperate rationally 
for the common 
good. Unless 
institutions resolve 
these social flaws 
large-scale 
technological 
interventions are 
dangerous. Nature as 
threatened by 
humanity, and 
humanity dependent 
on nature 
(interdependence). 
People have a moral 
responsibility to 
recognize human 
limitations and 
exercise self-
constraint. Humanity 
cannot be left in the 
hands of technical 
experts, but has to 
be governed by 
participatory 
political institutions.
Justice; 
control of 
knowledge
; equality; 
risk 
aversion; 
collective 
solidarity
Pluralistic 
participation 
and consensus; 
international 
and 
distributional 
equity; 
political and 
social realism 
and 
responsibility; 
institutional 
feasibility and 
social justice 
of 
technological 
solutions
Politics, social 
science, law
States and 
inter-
national 
organi-
zations, 
inter-
national 
non-govern-
mental 
organi-
zations
Climate change is a 
problem of 
governance at the 
international level 
because it requires 
coordinated 
political action. 
Without effective 
governance, new 
technologies can be 
subverted by 
private interests, 
remain ineffective, 
or create undesired 
climate effects. No 
effective global 
governance 
systems are 
currently in place 
to adequately guide 
and regulate 
geoengineering 
technologies. 
Metaphor: Slippery 
slope
Countries and 
people come 
together for 
the common 
good and 
agree on 
regulations of 
the 
technologies 
in the context 
of 
comprehensiv
e climate 
change 
actions.
A combi-
nation of 
self-restraint 
by scientists 
and 
oversight by 
policy 
makers and 
stakeholders 
that 
represent 
the common 
good creates 
an infra-
structure 
within 
which 
research and 
governance 
is carried 
out in a 
prudent and 
responsible 
way, prior 
to 
deployment 
of any 
radical 
technologies
.
We must not pursue 
geoengineering 
solutions until we 
have solved the 
question of the global 
governance of any 
interventions. 
Technologically, 
geoengineering may 
well be feasible, but 
without an effective 
regime for controlling 
its development and 
deployment, the 
outcome would be 
detrimental. The risks 
of unregulated 
geoengineering are 
substantial and 
therefore prohibitive. 
The governance 
argument extends to 
the exploration and 
development of 
technologies, not only 
to their deployment. 
On Hold: 
Should not 
proceed even 
with research 
and 
experimentati
on until 
governance 
issue is 
resolved, 
because once 
the 
technologies 
are developed 
they could 
end up in the 
wrong hands.
Moratorium 
until governance 
systems are in 
place. We 
should proceed 
neither with 
researching 
geoengineering 
technologies, 
nor 
experimentation 
with solutions, 
until those 
efforts can be 
governed as a 
public good by 
the international 
community.
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Conspi-
racy of 
Elite 
Control
Humanity as 
fragmented into 
those who are in 
control and those 
who are excluded or 
oppressed. Nature is 
used as an 
instrument by those 
with power in the 
pursuit of their 
political ends. 
People's moral 
responsibility is to 
resist technologies 
that are put forward 
to these ends, to 
"reveal elites' lies 
and interests" in 
order to ultimately 
"take back" control.
Egalitarian
ism; 
transparen
cy; 
libertariani
sm; 
independe
nce
(Hidden) 
interests and 
agendas of 
actors; 
centralization 
and scale of 
control and 
power; 
individual and 
local rights to 
opt out/in; 
distributed 
control of 
technological 
solutions
Rejection of 
scientific 
experise and 
political 
authority; 
elevation of 
lay knowledge 
& beliefs
Outsiders, 
lay people, 
elites
Geoengineering is 
already happening, 
deployed covertly 
by elites in science, 
politics and 
business to further 
their aims. Just like 
with climate 
change, the real 
problem is 
manipulation by 
those in power, and 
in that regard, 
climate change and 
geoengineering are 
no different.
Metaphor: 
Conspiracy by 
secret society, 
resistance fight
People have 
taken back 
power. There 
is an end to 
clandestine 
climate 
manipulation 
and the 
deployment 
of simpler 
and more 
transparent 
technologies.
Through the 
revelation to 
the public of 
secret 
information 
about 
geoengineer
ing by 
activists, 
people 
realize what 
is going on. 
They resist 
and 
mobilize to 
force 
transparenc
y and 
reduce the 
control of 
elites.  
Geoengineering 
represents yet another 
form of elites 
controlling and 
manipulating regular 
citizens' lives under 
disguise. This is not 
about climate change. 
Instead, governments, 
scientific elites and 
big business collude 
to manipulate the 
climate in order to 
control people. Any 
such attempts must be 
resisted and the 
knowledge the elites 
produce must be 
distrusted. The 
solution is to not only 
prevent 
geoengineering, but to 
also undermine the 
authority of those 
who are controlling 
the system.
Opposed: 
Strongly 
opposed to 
geoengineeri
ng and the 
actors 
pursuing it.
Empowerment 
of the people 
and disruption 
of existing 
power 
structures. We 
need to inform 
everyone that 
geoengineering 
is already being 
deployed and 
that it has 
consequences 
that favor elites 
at the expense of 
the people.
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Figure 1. Dialectic process
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Figure 2. Proportion of the imaginaries reflected in the news media during later phases 
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Figure 3. Co-occurrence of imaginaries in the media
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Figure 4. Conceptual model of creating a distant future with ‘as-if’ reality 
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